

GOV 388L: International Security

University of Texas at Austin, Spring 2012

Thursday 930a-1230p, Batts Hall 1.104

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Course Description and Objectives

This course is designed to give students an understanding of recent research, both theoretical and empirical, into the causes of war and peace. We will adopt a definition of war as “organized violence,” which allows us to consider conflicts that straddle the traditional IR/comparative divide. As such, we will examine both interstate and intrastate wars with an eye to their fundamental theoretical similarities, *not* their apparent differences.

In addition to surveying the recent literature, we will also work towards the development of student research (which will culminate in a research-oriented paper to be turned in at the end of the semester). Time permitting, we will throughout the semester set aside time to discuss research topics—where students can give and receive feedback on their ideas—and, if possible, we may schedule brainstorming sessions outside of class (they will, however, be purely optional). These will be important in developing your ideas, in learning how to engage the ideas of others, and in learning how to take and make use of feedback.

Requirements

Your grade is determined by three elements:

- 20% **Participation and Attendance.** Both, of course, are essential. Read each item on the required list closely each week, and come to class prepared to pick the readings apart in excruciating detail. I want *you* to do most of the talking, not me. Courses of this type are designed for you to learn how to work out your own ideas while engaging literatures in greater depth, to learn what good (and bad) science looks like, and to start thinking about doing your own research (that is, after all, why you’re here).
- 40% **Review Papers (2).** Students will be required to write two 5-page papers that review and critique the assigned readings in a given week, identifying (1) the common research question, (2) answers to the question, (3) relations between competing answers, and (4) which competing explanations are superior to the others. Think of this paper as a scaled-down version of review articles you see in journals, or even as a lit review that ties them together with a specific goal in mind. One of the papers will be assigned to a given week during the first

session, and students in their assigned weeks will use their paper (which is due the same day that the readings will be discussed in class) to help lead class discussion. Students are free to choose the set of readings on which they will write the second paper (and there are no presentational duties assigned to this one), but note that this second paper is also due on the same day that we will discuss those readings. Late review papers will *not* be accepted.

- 40% **Research-Oriented Paper.** The last formal requirement is an original research-oriented paper. By “research-oriented” I mean an approximately 14-18 page essay that sets the stage for a full-blown research paper that you can one day present and/or submit for publication. The centerpiece of the paper will be an original idea on which you can build a research project. By idea, I mean a theoretical contribution, one that is well-motivated by an empirical puzzle and situated within the relevant literature. You don’t need to execute the research design: the goal here is to think about the role of good theory and how, once properly developed, the appropriate research design will be clear. (But theory *always* comes first.) Your paper should (1) motivate the research question, (2) review the shortcomings of recent literature and identify your points of departure, (3) present the argument, paying close attention to logical consistency and validity, (4) present hypotheses and empirical implications, and (5) discuss the contributions of the effort (if it were to become a full-fledged research paper).

University and Campus Policies

1. Students with disabilities.

Students with disabilities may request appropriate academic accommodations from the Division of Diversity and Community Engagement, Services for Students with Disabilities, 471-6259, <http://www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/ssd/>

2. Accommodations for religious holidays.

By university policy, you must notify me of your pending absence at least fourteen days prior to the date of observance of a religious holy day. If you must miss a class, an examination, a work assignment, or a project in order to observe a religious holy day, you will be given an opportunity to complete the missed work within a reasonable time after the absence.

3. Academic dishonesty.

“*Scholastic dishonesty*... includes, but is not limited to, cheating, plagiarism, collusion, falsifying academic records, and any act designed to give unfair academic advantage to the student (such as, but not limited to, submission of essentially the same written assignment for two courses without prior permission of the instructor, providing false or misleading information in an effort to receive a postponement or an extension on a test, quiz, or other assignment), or the attempt to commit such an act” (Section 11-802 (b), *Institutional Rules on Student Services and Activities*).

If you have any questions about what constitutes scholastic dishonesty, you should consult with me and the following website: <http://deanofstudents.utexas.edu/sjs/academicintegrity.html>. Any student that violates this policy will fail this course and have the details of the violation reported to Student Judicial Services.

4. Emergency evacuation policy.

In the event of a fire or other emergency, it may be necessary to evacuate a building rapidly. Upon the activation of a fire alarm or the announcement of an emergency in a university building, all occupants of the building are required to evacuate and assemble outside. Once evacuated, no one may re-enter the building without instruction to do so from the Austin Fire Department, University of Texas at Austin Police Department, or Fire Prevention Services office.

Students should familiarize themselves with all the exit doors of each room and building they occupy at the university, and should remember that the nearest exit routes may not be the same as the way they typically enter buildings.

Students requiring assistance in evacuation shall inform their instructors in writing during the first week of class. Faculty members must then provide this information to the Fire Prevention Services office by fax (512-232-2759), with "Attn. Mr. Roosevelt Easley" written in the subject line.

Information regarding emergency evacuation routes and emergency procedures can be found at <http://www.utexas.edu/emergency>.

Readings

Four texts are required for this course, all of which are available at the bookstore:

- Powell, Robert. 1999. *In The Shadow of Power* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- O'Neill, Barry. 1999. *Honor, Symbols, and War* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2005. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2007. *War and The State* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Chiozza, Giacomo and Goemans, Hein. 2011. *Leaders and International Conflict* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

All other readings will be available electronically. I also expect that you will have completed the readings before the sessions for which they are assigned.

Course Outline and Schedule

Session 1. Theoretical Foundations

Required

- Wagner, 2007. Chapters 1-3.
- Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2004. "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory." *International Interactions* 30:87-107.

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2006. "Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace." *American Political Science Review* 100.4:637-642.

Recommended

- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2001. "Who's Afraid of Rational Choice Theory?" [\[Link\]](#)
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, The State, and War* New York: Columbia University Press.
- Singer, J. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14:77-92.
- Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society* New York: Columbia University Press.

Session 2. Bargaining and War

Required

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49:379-414.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60:169-203.
- Leventoglu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2008. "Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?" *International Studies Quarterly* 52.3:533-553.
- Slantchev, Branislav L., and Ahmer Tarar. 2011. "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.1:135-148.

Recommended

- Morrow, James D. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:941-972.
- Fearon, James D. 1996. Bargaining Over Objects That Influence Future Bargaining Power. Manuscript. [\[Link\]](#)
- Powell, Robert. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:1-30.
- Meirowitz, Adam, and Anne E. Sartori. 2008. "Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3:327-352.
- Wittman, Donald. 2009. "Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?" *American Journal of Political Science* 53.3:588-602.
- Chadeaux, Thomas. 2011. "Bargaining Over Power: When do Shifts in Power Lead to War?" *International Theory* 20.3:228-253.

Session 3. Power and War

Required

- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1994. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power." *American Political Science Review* 88.3:593-607.
- Powell, 1999. Chapters 1, 3&4.
- Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom, and Wonjae Hwang. 2008. "War, Power, and Bargaining." *Journal of Politics* 70.4:1203-1216.

Recommended

- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1986. "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power." *World Politics* 38.4:546-576.
- Reed, William. 2003. "Information, Power, and War." *American Political Science Review* 97.4:633-641.

Session 4. Signaling I

Required

- Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41.1:68-90.
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46.2:175-200.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." *American Political Science Review* 99.4:533-547.
- Trager, Robert F. 2010. "Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters." *American Political Science Review* 104.2:347-368.

Recommended

- Nalebuff, Barry. 1991. "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World." *World Politics* 43.3:313-335.
- Kydd, Andrew. 1997. "Game Theory and the Spiral Model." *World Politics* 49.3:371-400.
- Zagare, Frank, and Marc Kilgour. 2000. *Perfect Deterrence* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2004. "Rational Appeasement." *International Organization* 58.2:345-373.

- Sartori, Anne E. 2005. *Deterrence by Diplomacy* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rider, Toby J. 2009. "Understanding Arms Race Onset: Rivalry, Threat, and Territorial Competition." *Journal of Politics* 71.2:693-703.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2010. "Feigning Weakness." *International Organization* 64.2:357-388.

Session 5. Signaling II

Required

- Kydd 2005, whole book.

Session 6. War Duration and Termination

Required

- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 44.3:469-484.
- Powell, Robert. 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2:344-361.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2004. "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4:813-829.
- Wolford, Scott, Dan Reiter, and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2011. "Information, Commitment, and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.4:556-579.
- Langlois, Catherine C., and Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. 2009. "Does Attrition Behavior Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis." *International Studies Quarterly* 53.4:1075-1094.

Recommended

- Wittman, Donald. 1979. "How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23.4:743-763.
- Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 1997. *Strategic Assessment in War* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Goemans, Hein E. 2000. *War and Punishment* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97.4
- Smith, Alastair and Allan C. Stam. 2004. "Bargaining and The Nature of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48.6:783-813.

- Fearon, James D. 2004. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41.3:275-301.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fearon, James D. 2007. Fighting Rather Than Bargaining. Manuscript. [\[Link\]](#)
- Leventoglu, Bahar, and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2007. "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4:755-771.
- Reiter, Dan. 2009. *How Wars End* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Session 7 (17 March). *The Duration of Peace*

Required

- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace." *International Organization* 57.2:337-72.
- Werner, Suzanne, and Amy Yuen. 2005. "Making and Keeping Peace." *International Organization* 59.2:261-292.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium." *Security Studies* 14.4:565-606.
- Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton. 2008. The Lifespan of Written Constitutions. Manuscript. [\[Link\]](#)
- Lo, Nigel, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter. 2008. "Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914-2001." *International Organization* 62:717-736.

Recommended

- Werner, Suzanne. 1999. "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms." *American Journal of Political Science* 43.3:912-934.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48:269-292.
- Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton. 2009. *The Endurance of National Constitutions* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Session 8. *Domestic Politics I: Guns, Butter, and Distributive Politics*

- Powell 1999, Chapter 2.

- McDonald, Patrick J. 2007. "The Purse Strings of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.3:569-582.
- Chassang, Sylvain, and Gerard Padró i Miquel. 2009. "Economic Shocks and Civil War." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 4.3:211-228.
- Dal Bó, Ernesto, and Robert Powell. 2009. "A Model of Spoils Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 53.1:207-222.
- Arena, Philip. 2010. "Why Not Guns and Butter: Responses to Economic Turmoil." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6.4:339-348.

Session 9. Domestic Politics II: The Democratic Peace

Required

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93.4:781-807.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92.2:377-389.
- Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2004. "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcome." *American Journal of Political Science* 48:296-313.
- Wagner 2007, Ch. 6
- Debs, Alexandre, and H.E. Goemans. 2010. "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War." *American Political Science Review* 104.3:430-445.

Recommended

- Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace* New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. *Democracies at War* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2007. "Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 51.3:509-532.
- Keshk, Omar M.G., Rafael Reuveny, and Brian M. Pollins. 2010. "Trade and Conflict: Proximity, Country Size, and Measures." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27.1:3-27.
- Polachek, Solomon, and Jun Xiang. 2010. "How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game." *International Organization* 64.1:133-144.

Session 10. Domestic Politics III: Audience Costs

Required

- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88:577-592.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. "Looking for Audience Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45.1:32-60.
- Leventoglu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. "Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining." *American Political Science Review* 99.3:419-433.
- Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62.1:35-64.
- Snyder, Jack L., and Erica D. Borghard. 2011. "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound." *American Political Science Review* 105.3:437-436.

Recommended

- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2006. "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs." *International Studies Quarterly* 50.2:445-477.
- Kurizaki, Shuhei. 2007. "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy." *American Political Science Review* 101.3:543-558.

Session 11. Domestic Politics IV: Leaders

Required

- Chiozza and Goemans 2011, whole book.

Recommended

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regimes and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89.4:841-855.
- Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival* Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59.1:1-38.
- Wolford, Scott. 2007. "The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4:772-788.

- Arena, Philip. 2008. "Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25:136-151.
- Goemans, Hein, and Mark Fey. 2009. "Risky But Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble." *Journal of Politics* 71.1:35-54.

Session 12. Third Parties I: Alignment and Intervention

Required

- Powell 1999, Ch. 5.
- Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Model of Aggregation in Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35.4:904-933.
- Werner, Suzanne. 2000. "Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement." *American Journal of Political Science* 44.4:720-732.
- Favretto, Katja. 2009. "Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion and Bias." *American Political Science Review* 103.2:248-263.

Recommended

- Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 39.4:405-426.
- Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1996. "War Expansion and War Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40.1:4-15.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47:427-439.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. 2004. "Stable Alliance Formation in Distributional Conflict." *European Journal of Political Economy* 20.4:829-852.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2006. "When Can Mediators Build Trust?" *American Political Science Review* 100.3:449-462.
- Beardsley, Kyle. 2008. "Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time-Inconsistency Problems." *American Journal of Political Science* 52.4:723-740.
- Yuen, Amy. 2009. "Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.5:745-773.

Session 13. Third Parties II: Honor, Face, and Prestige

Required

- O'Neill 1999, whole book.

Session 14. Inter- and intra-state War

Required

- Salehyan, Idean. 2007. "Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups." *World Politics* 59.1:217-242.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Schultz. 2008. "Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52.4:479-506.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2010. "The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars." *International Organization* 64.1:281-312.
- Bapat, Navin A. 2010. "Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups." *British Journal of Political Science* 42.1:1-29.
- Salehyan, Idean. 2010. "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54.3:493-515.

Session 15. International Institutions

Required

- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90.4:715-735.
- Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review* 95.4:845-858.
- Chapman, Terrence L. 2009. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." *International Organization* 63.4:733-764.
- Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2009. "Mechanism Design Goes to War: Peaceful Outcomes with Interdependent and Correlated Types." *Review of Economic Design* 13:233-250.
- Chapman, Terrence L., and Scott Wolford. 2010. "International Institutions, Strategy, and Crisis Bargaining." *Journal of Politics* 72.1:227-242.

Recommended

- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism." *International Organization* 52.2:397-419.

- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55.4:761-800.
- Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59:527-557.
- Gilligan, Michael, Leslie Johns, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2010. "Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54.1:5-38.